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Banking confidentiality and state control of currency transac-
tions and related criminal activities 
 
- (p. 2) ad art. 192 Sr 
According to art. 192 Sr a bank violates the criminal law when 
summoned as a witness or as an expert, it refuses to perform 
its  legal  duties  in  that  capacity.  The  legal  obligations  of 
witnesses and experts are the following: 
- to appear in court at the right time 
- to give evidence  
- to undertake the required research activities 
- to write an expert opinion 
- to take a vow or make a pledge to tell the truth 
 
 
- (p. 5) ad art. 272 Sr 
In art. 272 Sr the circumstances are elaborated in which it is 
a  crime  to  divulge  secrets  to  people  not  entitled  to  that 
information.  One  of  the  main  elements  in  question  is  the 
situation where someone is by way of statutory obligation bound 
to  keep  the  secret.  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  the 
provision  in  art.  11  WPR  does  not  create  the  kind  of  legal 
obligation  required  for  the  applicability  of  art.  272  Sr  on 
indiscrete behaviour by banks. 
 
- (p.6) ad inbeslagneming 
Of course, financial institutions - including banks - are also 
subject  to  the  ordinary  powers  of  seasure.  Art.  94  Sv  spells 
out  that  goods  may  be  seized  when  they  can  be  usefull  for 
attaining  the  truth  in  the  fact  finding  process  or  when  they 
can be forfeited by the court. The details of this arrangement 
(which officials have this power, the conditions for exercising 
the power, etc.) are stated in artt. 95 -114 Sv and in special 
sections  of  the  Code  such  as  art.  539p  Sv.  For  present 
purposes, suffice it to mention only art. 105 Sv (the examining 
magistrate  can  order  anyone  who  is  reasonably  expected  to  be 
the keeper of goods that can be seized, to hand them over or to 
deposit them at the court) and art. 107 Sv (limiting the power 
of art. 105 Sv in as much letters and other documents can only 
be ordered to be handed over if they belong to the suspect, are 
adressed  to  the  suspect,  and  when  these  papers  have  been  the 
object or the instrument of the crime). 
 
- (p. 7) ad invoering 23008 en 23009 
This  new  legislation  was  designed  to  take  effect  at  january 
1st, 1994. Due to some slight delay in the latter stages of the 
legislative process, both bills in the end got the force of law 
starting februari 1st, 1994. 
 
- (p. 8) ad indicatoren voor 6 maanden 
The limitation for a period of six months is intended to keep 
the  system  a  flexible  one.  Since  the  techniques  employed  by 
money  launderers  are  likely  to  change  frequently,  the  latest 
developments  will  continually  have  to  be  met  by  appropriate countermeasures on the part of the government. 
 
- (p. 10) ad functie Meldpunt 
The job of this unit is to collect all the reports and then to 
analyse  and  interpret  all  the  information  that  comes  in.  The 
objective  is  to  look  for  clues  which  can  be  used  in  either 
solving past crimes or preventing new crimes to occur. In both 
instances,  the  unit  will  supply  the  relevant  material  to  the 
competent  investigative  authorities  and/or  to  the  public 
prosecutor.  
It is expected that unit will pass on information elicited from 
the reports in three categories of cases: 
a.  data  which  are  sufficient  for  a  ’probable  cause’  that  a 
crime has been committed; 
b. data which are by their very nature suitable for incorpora-
tion  in  a  so-called  CID-registration  (this  is  a  data-base  of 
the criminal intelligence service); 
c. data which are relevant for the detection or prevention of 
crime, with special emphasis on possible future crime posing a 
weighty threat to the legal order because of the seriousness of 
the  crime,  the  frquency  thereof,  or  the  fact  that  the 
violations are committed within the framework of an organisa-
tion (see MvT p. 13-14 and D.R. Doorenbos DD 1993, p. 773). 
The  central  unit  thus  serves  in  the  capacity  of  a  buffer 
between those who have the obligation to report unusual trans-
actions on the one side and the agents of the criminal justice 
system  on  the  other.  The  idea  underlying  this  arrangement  is 
that  processing  of  information  and  evaluating  the  results 
thereof  in  terms  of  criminal  conduct,  is  not  a  matter  that 
should be left to ordinary citizens. 
 
- (p. 11) Aanpassing strafwetgeving c.a. 
 
In  the  introduction  to  the  present  section  of  our  paper,  we 
mentioned  the  EC-directive  91/308  on  moneylaundering.  We  have 
already explained that the requirements of this directive have 
chiefly  been  met  by  the  introduction  of  two  new  bills  in 
february 1994 (MOT & Wif ’94). There is, however, a third and 
most important vehicle for combatting moneylaundering, consis-
ting of several provisions concerning handling of and profiting 
from  criminally  obtained  property.  Basically,  the  relevant 
articles of the Criminal Code read as follows.  
 
Art. 416 Sr deals with intentional conduct: 
"A person shall be guilty of knowingly handling stolen property 
and  liable  to  imprisonment  for  a  term  not  exceeding  for 
years or to a fine of the fifth category where: 
- he acquires, possesses or transmits property, or asserts or 
transmits  a  personal  or  proprietary  right  in  property, 
and,  at  the  time  of  acquisition  or  possession  of  the 
property or of the assertion of the right, he knows that 
the property was stolen; 
- where, intentionally and with a view to profit, he possesses 
or  transfers  stolen  property  or  transfers  a  personal  or 
proprietary right in stolen property. 
The  same  liability  shall  be  incurred  by  a  person  who 
intentionally  profits  from  the  fruits  of  sale  of  stolen property." 
 
Art. 417 Sr covers the question of multiple offences: 
"A person who is repeatedly found guilty of knowingly handling 
stolen property shall be liable to imprisonment for a term 
not  exceeding  six  years  or  to  a  fine  of  the  fifth 
category". 
 
And,  finally,  art.  417bis  Sr  criminalizes  the  unintentional 
variety, based on negligence: 
"A  person  shall  be  guilty  of  handling  stolen  property  and 
liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year 
or to a fine of the fifth category where: 
-  he  acquires,  possessesor  transmits  property  or  asserts  or 
transmits a personal or proprietary right in property and, 
at the time of acquisition or possession of the property 
or of the assertion of the right, he could reasonably have 
expected that the property was stolen; 
-where, with a view to profit, he possesses or transfers stolen 
property or transfers a personal or proprietary right in 




These - rather broad - provisions got their current wording in 
1989.  They  were  the  end  product  of  an  innovation  intended  to 
have  a  firmer  repression  of  property  crime.  It  was  reasoned 
that this type of crime will be effectively discouraged when it 
is  made  more  difficult  to  get  rid  of  illegally  obtained 
property. In the official explanation of the objectives of the 
new wording of these articles, the Minister of Justice stated 
that  this  also  met  the  international  desire  to  take  action 
against the  laundering of money acquired by drug trafficking. 
Ever since, the government has held the opinion that it is not 
necessary - nor desirable - to introduce a separate section of 




As is evident in the quoted contents of art. 416 Sr, handling 
stolen goods (identical with money laundering in so far as the 
illegal  property  consists  of  money)  is  punishable  when  the 
perpetrator acts intentionally (question 3.1.4.). 
The element of intent first has to be centered on the act of 
handling itself. Secondly, the intention should extent to the 
fact  that  the  property  was  stolen  or  otherwise  obtained  by 
means of criminal behaviour. The handler does not necessarily 
have to know by which specific crime the property was acquired; 
however,  conviction  is  only  possible  if  the  judge  can  give 
                     
    
1Vide art. 437 Sr imposing an obligation on certain branches 
of trade to keep a register of the merchandise in order to be 
able to distinguish between bona fide and mala fide businesses. 
    
2These  remarks  answer  points  3.1.1.  and  3.1.2.  of  the 
questionnaire. See on this matter also, C.D. Schaap, Witwassen 
van geld strafbaar als plegen van heling, Tijdschrift voor de 
politie 1993, p. 141-142. these details in his verdict. 
The  Dutch  case-law  has  given  a  wide  interpretation  to  the 
concept of intent. Consequently, it not only covers situations 
in  which  the  offender  acts  deliberately  with  the  proscribed 
objective. Under the label of ’conditional intent’ the Supreme 
Court  of  the  Netherlands  extended  this  concept  to  cases  in 
which  the  accused  consciously  accepted  a  substantial  chance 
that the property was in fact stolen.
3 This formula in which a 
certain risk-taking is essential, is also applicable when the 
words of the criminal law require (or: seem to require) posi-
tive knowledge on the part of the perpetrator (as in art. 416 
Sr: "he knows that the property was stolen").
4 
If  the  perpetrator  had  to  presume  the  illicit  origin  of  the 
assets  or  if  he  acted  recklessly  in  this  respect,  he  falls 
under  the  scope  of  art.  417bis  Sr.  The  difference  with  the 
construction  of  ’conditional  intent’  is  that  art.  417bis  Sr 
deals with situations in which the offender had not consciously 
accepted the risk that the property was illegally obtained. The 
core  of  his  fault  here  is  that  he  should  have  thought  (and 
should  have  made  inquiries  as  to  the  origin  of  the  property) 
were he actually didn’t.  
 
The Dutch law punishes the crime of handling stolen goods/money 
laundering in case the offence is committed abroad, depending 
primarily  on  the  nationality  of  the  perpetrator  (question 
3.1.5.). If the offender is a Dutch citizen and the offence is 
also  punishable  according  to  the  law  of  the  nation  where  the 
act took place, then the Dutch criminal law can be applied (see 
art.  5  section  1  sub  2  Sr).  The  same  holds  true  for  the 
foreigner  who  begets  the  Dutch  nationality  after  having  com-
mitted the crime elswhere.
5  
Then there is the case of the so-called derived or subsidiary 
jurisdiction, mentioned in art. 4a Sr. This principle applies 
when  the  Dutch  government  takes  over  the  prosecution  of  an 
offender  from  the  country  on  whose  territory  the  crime  was 
committed, on the basis of treaty establishing the competence 
to  do so. The procedure - and the conditions for granting or 
refusing  a  request  to  take  over  the  prosecution  from  another 
country - is described in art. 552x Sv ff. 
 
The  provisions  of  administrative  law  for  combatting  money 
laundering  are  limited  in  number  as  well  as  in  scope  and 
importance (question 3.2.1.). Currency imports and exports are 
covered  by  the  'Wet  financiële  betrekkingen  buitenland'  (the 
law  on  financial  relations  with  foreigners  and  foreign  coun-
                     
    
3Vide the famous decision by the Supreme Court on november 
9th 1954, published in Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1955, no. 55. 
    
4D.R. Doorenbos, Het criminaliseren van money laundering als 
communautaire  verplichting,  Delikt  en  Delinkwent 
1993, p. 353. The opposite judgement by the Appelate 
Court of Den Bosch d.d. april 14th 1992, NJ 1992, 432 
was overturned by the Supreme Court in ... 
    
5See Hazewinkel-Suringa-Remmelink, p. 493. tries)
6 The main point of reference is to leave as much freedom 
of  action  to  the  people  as  is  possible.  In  this  so-called 
’positive  system’  any  cross  border  transfer  of  currency  is 
allowed  unless  it  is  specifically  prohibited  by  law.  The 
restrictive measures which can be imposed by monetary authori-
ties are strictly governed by two objectives: protection of the 
domestic  capital  market  and  domestic  restictions  of  credit. 
Art. 4 of the law aims to protect de Dutch capital market in 
case of disturbances caused by excessive demand by foreigners. 
Articles  5,  6  and  8  provide  measures  to  protect  the  monetary 
policies of the government. Art. 7 allows for restrictions in 
the  transfer  of  currency  when  this  is  necessary  to  preserve 




The  infringement  of  the  exchange  and  criminal  provisions  can 
lead to very serious sanctions inflicted upon the bank itself 
(question 3.2.2.).  
Violation  of  the  just  mentioned  administrative  provisions  is 
classified as an economic crime. The Wet Economische Delicten 
(Economic Crime Bill) contains a catalogue of special sanctions 
(articles  5-10).  Of  course,  a  legal  person  could  never  be 
sentenced  to  prison;  hence  monetary  sanctions  are  exclusive. 
According  to  art.  7  sub  c  the  bank  can  be  closed  -  either 
completely or partly. Art. 8 opens the possibility of putting a 
trustee in charge of the bank. We do like to add immediately, 
however, that these far reaching sanctions are very unlikely to 
be levied in cases of money laundering. From a practical point 
of view, they therefore constitute merely hypothetical options 
for the judge. More realistic are the measures of forfeiture, 
confiscation and withdrawal from circulation (art. 8). 
The  earlier  mentioned  obligations  in  the  Wet  inzake  Spaarbe-
wijzen,  the  Wet  MOT  and  the  Wif  1994  are  also  enforced  by 
classifying violations as economic crimes. 
In the Netherlands there is also a general criminal liability 
for  legal  persons  (art.  51  Sr).  In  case  of  conviction  for 
violating  rules  on  handling  stolen  property/money  laundering 
(articles  416  and  417bis  Sr,  discussed  above),  the  maximum 
penalty  the  bank  could  face  is  Dfl  1.000.000  (see  art.  23 
sections 3 and 7 Sr).  
 
The  question  of  profiting  from  the  proceeds  of  a  tax  crime, 
particularly  of  tax  fraud,  leads  us  to  point  out  a  basic 
problem in the Dutch criminal law (question 3.3.1.). If someone 
fails to report income to the tax authorities, he will commit 
the crime foreseen in art. 68 AWR or art. 225 Sr. His financial 
position  will  be  better  than  it  would  have  been  had  he 
                     
    
6This law was adopted on May 28th, 1980, Stb. 321 and went 
into force on May 1st, 1981. 
    
7’De Nederlandse Bank’ (the Central Bank of the Netherlands) 
has  issued  a  number  of  general  administrative  provisions 
concerning the data and information which must be supplied to 
the  Bank  in  the  event  of  transnational  currency  transactions 
(sources: AAV 1989/1; UV 1986/1; and UV 1986/2). fulfilled his legal obligations. But it is hard to say that the 
amount  of  money  he  would  have  had  to  pay  in  taxes  is  now 
acquired  by  crime.  Instead,  the  perpetrator  had  the  money  in 
his  possession  previous  to  the  fraud,  so  it  can  be  argued 
persuasively that the provisions on handling stolen goods/money 
laundering are not applicable.  
The situation is different when the fraud leads the tax autho-
rities to pay an undeserved sum of money to the offender. In 
that  case  a  third  party  obtaining  the  proceeds  while  knowing 
its origin, falls under the scope of article 416 Sr. 
 
In  the  preparatory  documents  leading  up  to  the  Wet  MOT,  the 
government asserted the desirability of financial institutions 
which  in  the  course  of  their  business  come  accross  criminal 
acts, make a full report to the police. Of course this may be 
desirable, but in the Netherlands there is no general duty to 
report crimes to the officials in the criminal justice system. 
An  exeption  to  this  rule  is  laid  down  in  art.  162  Sv:  in 
certain  circumstances  civil  servants  are  required  to  report 
crime. The obligation concerns crime outside the scope of their 
competence  to  investigate,  but  which  they  nevertheless 
encounter  while  fulfilling  their  duties.  On  the  other  hand 
there is an article in de fiscal law containing an obligation 
to secrecy for the authorities with regard to the information 
they receive when enforcing the fiscal law (art. 67 AWR). The 
reasoning behind this, is that the citizen who is under so many 
obligations to supply all sorts of documents, should be able to 
be confident that the information he delivered will not get out 
of  the system of fiscal law enforcement. In what way are the 
conflicting rules of art. 162 Sv and art. 67 AWR balanced? The 
solution is that the fiscal inspector is only allowed to report 
a crime he has come across, when this is permitted by the so-
called ’Instruction on supplying information’: art. 48 of this 
instruction demands an evaluation of the case by the director 
of tax collection before any report can be filed.
8 
 
The Dutch legislator recently created probative facilities and 
a de facto reversement of the burden of evidence in order to 
allow the authorities to order the confiscation of the assets 
which are suspected to be of criminal origin (question 5.3.). 
These  measures  are  part  of  a  larger  scheme  to  combat  various 
forms  of  lucrative  crime.  The  features  of  this  scheme  are  as 
follows. 
On december 10th 1992 the dutch parliament approved Bill 21504 
concerning the measure for the confiscation of the profits of 
crime (confiscation order). The bill went into effect on april 
1st 1993. The object of the bill is to modify the dutch penal 
code and the code of criminal procedure in order to deal effec-
tively  with  highly  profitable  crime  such  as  drugsdealing  and 
fraud (especially E.C.-fraud). The general idea is to hit the 
criminal  where  it  hurts  most,  that  is  in  his  finances.  To 
achieve this goal the legal possibilities for the seizure and 
confiscation of ill-gained assets are widened. 
The  measure  of  confiscation  is  borrowed  from  the  financial 
                     
    
8See Vakstudies, art. 67 AWR, p. 41. penal legislation and was introduced in the penal code in 1983. 
The measure means that a judge can order a convicted person to 
pay a sum of money to the state which has the effect of taking 
away the estimated financial rewards he has obtained from the 
crime  he  has  committed.  This  measure  can  be  imposed  in 
conjunction with penalties (for example imprisonment) and other 
measures. The failure to pay the amount owed will result in the 
imposition  of  default  detention  (for  a  maximum  period  of  6 
years).The  Bill  of  december  10th  1992  modifies  the  existing 
measure in the following respects: 
-  The  confiscation  order  is  now  separated  from  the  ordinary 
criminal  proceedings.  There  is  a  mandatory  provision  to  the 
effect that the confiscation order must be made in a separate 
proceeding  upon  a  specific  application  by  the  public  pros-
ecutor. As a result, extraordinary procedural rules can apply 
for the confiscation order. The investigation of the volume of 
the  unlawfully  acquired  property  will  be  primarily  financial 
and technical in nature, and it has been recommended that it be 
led by a specialized section of court. The establishment of a 
separate procedure has the further advantage that the financial 
investigation, which is by definition a complex matter, need no 
longer unnecessarily delay the investigation and prosecution of 
the offence itself. 
- A confiscation order may be made not only of the offence for 
which the accused is being prosecuted but also for "comparable 
offenses",  where  there  is  adequate  evidence  that  the  person 
concerned actually committed them (article 36e, section 2 Sr).
9 
- According to the third section of article 36e Sr, where an 
accused is sentenced to a fine of the fifth category, a deci-
sion  may  be  taken  to  deprive  him  of  such  assets  as  may  have 
been  acquired  by  any  unlawful  means.  A  confiscation  order  in 
this context does not have to be based on a causal relationship 
between the offence of which the accused is convicted and the 
specific  assets.  Any  property  that  can  be  shown  to  have  been 
acquired directly or indirectly by any unlawful means qualifies 
for withdrawal under the amended third section of article 36e 
Sr. 
-  In  the  code  of  criminal  procedure  a  new  form  of  pretrial 
investigation is introduced. This so called ’criminal financial 
investigation’  is  secret  in  nature  and  is  meant  to  establish 
what illegal gains the suspect has made. The public prosecutor 
is in charge of the criminal financial investigation. This is a 
remarkable  change  to  the  standard  pretrial  stage  where  the 
investigating  judge is usually the dominant authority. In the 
criminal financial investigation the role of the pretrial judge 
is  limited  to  allowing  the  investigation  to  commence  and  to 
deciding on the application of a number of coercive measures. 
Compared  to  the  preliminary  judicial  investigation  the  rights 
of the defence are restricted in the criminal financial inves-
tigation.  
-  A  second  change  in  the  code  of  criminal  procedure  is  the 
                     
    
9See re the notion of ’comparable offences’: J. Wöretshofer, 
Pluk  ze  -  Nieuwe  mogelijkheden  tot  ontneming  van  crimineel 
vermogen, in: P.C. van Duyne a.o. (eds.), Misdaadgeld, Arnhem 
1993, p. 36 ff. introduction  of  interim  seizure  measures  to  guarantee  the 
execution of confiscation orders. There are also rules for the 
seizure  of  real  estate,  other  registrated  property  and  regi-
strated shares and securities. 
Up untill this moment (the end of 1993) the results of the new 
legislation are not encouraging. Only an amount of approxima-
tely  Dfl  11.000.000,-  has  been  confiscated  since  april  1st. 
This  may be caused by either a lack of manpower and/or igno-
rance of the new legal provisions.  
 
The scheme to fight the more lucrative areas of crime also has 




In  the past decade there has been a growing awareness of the 
problems caused by the phenomenon of lucrative types of crime. 
One  of  the  responses  to  the  challenge  posed  by  this  develop-
ment, has been to initiate changes of the criminal law in order 
to combat money laundering. Three innovations stand out. First, 
there is the new article in the Criminal Code on handling of 
stolen property (art. 416 Sr ff.). Secondly, parliament adopted 
the MOT (the Bill on reporting unusual financial transactions). 
And finally, the renovated Wif went into effect early 1994 (the 
Bill  on  checking  identities  while  providing  financial 
services). 
The  Dutch  government  is  convinced  that  these  key  pieces  of 
legislation  comply  with  every  basic  requirement  in  the  EC 
guidelines  on  money  laundering  ((91/308/EEG).
10  Hence  there  is 
no intention of further reviewing the system shortly (question 
6.1.). Nevertheless, it is of course unclear at present how the 
judiciary will operate on the basis of all the new provisions. 
It is equally difficult to predict what direction the academic 
debate  on  these  issues  will  take.  Consequently,  there  is  a 
chance  that  jurisprudential  developments  and/or  academic 
reflexion  will  show  major  shortcomings  in  the  present  system 
which will then have to be remedied. 
 
Adressing  the  question  of  criticism  of  the  existing  system 
(question 6.2.), we would first like to point out the inherent 
limitations of an approach relying so heavily on the articles 
on  handling stolen goods (artt. 416 Sr ff.). We feel that it 
would be appropriate to add separate offences dealing with the 
specific  phenomenon  of  money  laundering.  The  following  argu-
ments may be invoked to support this position: 
- the articles on handling stolen assets were primarily desig-
ned to discourage property crime; the explicit and preponderant 
objective was to diminish the incidence of theft, breaking and 
entering,  and  the  like,  money  laundering  only  came  in  as  a 
convenient afterthought. 
-  the  articles  under  consideration  are  very  broadly  worded, 
thus carrying the risk of capricious application. 
- a separate provision dealing with money laundering would be 
                     
    
10See the table in the parliamentary proceedings concerning 
the Wif ’94: 23008, no. 3, p. 11. consistent with the popular view that this is a crime with a 
character different from that of handling stolen goods. 
- introducing a new and specific article would also convey an 
important symbolic message to society that the legal community 
expressly condems money laundering; this could have a certain 
preventive effect. 
- Last but not least: the money launderer cannot be tackled by 
the  articles  on  handling  stolen  property  if  he  himself  also 




As far as the MOT is concerned, there are at least two critical 
areas  of  interest.  The  first  one  is  the  insoluble  problem  of 
the  list  of  indicators  to  recognise  ’unusual’  transactions. 
Here  we  are  faced  with  a  dilemma.  It  is  important  -  indeed 
vital - to have a flexible system. Hence the upgrading of the 
list  of  indicators  at  six  months  intervals.  The  backside  of 
this  arrangement,  however,  is  that  the  administration  is  by 
definition  always  just  a  little  late  in  pursuing  the  latest 
techniques employed by money launderers. And by publishing the 
list  of  indicators  periodically,  the  criminals  are  given  the 
opportunity to adjust their strategy accordingly.
12 
The second crucial question that can be raised is whether the 
reports  of  unusual  transactions  will  in  actual  practice  also 
lead  to  succesful  criminal  investigations.
13  This  will  depend, 
to a substantial degree, on the number of reports which will be 
filed. Experience elsewhere has shown that reports could become 
virtually  useless  if  the  central  agency  is  flooded  with  to 




Criminal  law  intrinsically  strikes  a  balance  between  the 
general interest of preserving the legal order on the one hand 
and  the  principle  of  individual  liberty  on  the  other.
15  It  is 
undeniable  that  the  measures  taken  in  order  to  combat  money 
laundering  are  almost  exclusively  designed  from  the  former 
point  of  view.  Because  money  laundering  is  systematically 
linked with  the phenomenon of organised crime, the government 
feels  justified  in  taking  ’strong  action’.  This  entails  an 
almost non existent mitigating effect by the usally restraining 
                     
    
11C.D. Schaap, J.M. Reijntjes, Witwassen van geld strafbaar 
als heling, in: P.C. van Duyne a.o. (eds.), Misdaadgeld, Arnhem 
1993, p. 121-122. 
    
12J.P.  van  Soest,  Europees  witwassen,  in:  P.C.  van  Duyne 
a.o. (eds.), op. cit., p. 158-159. 
    
13J.M.  Reijntjes,  Met  de  dader  ook  de  buit!,  in:  P.C.  van 
Duyne a.o. (eds.), op. cit. p. 84-85. 
    
14These  observations  on  handling  stolen  property,  MOT  and 
Wif ’94 also suffice to answer question 6.3. 
    
15See  the  impressive  account  in  A.C.  't  Hart,  R.  Foqué, 
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